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Credit constraints are an almost ubiquitous assumption in development
economics. Yet direct evidence for credit constraints is limited, and many
observations consistent with credit constraints are equally compatible with
precautionary saving or myopic (non-forward-looking) consumption. Using
household panel data and a source of widely anticipated income in South
Africa, this paper ﬁrst tests and rejects the standard consumption model
with perfect capital markets. The standard model enriched with credit
constraints is then contrasted with precautionary saving and myopic con-
sumption as alternative explanations for the observed expenditure pattern.
The standard model with credit constraints cannot be rejected in favour of
precautionary saving or myopic consumption.
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1 Introduction
Credit constraints are a standard assumption in development economics, but there
is surprisingly little robust evidence that such constraints are present and binding
on household behaviour. Furthermore, many observations that are consistent with
credit constraints are equally consistent with precautionary saving or a myopic
model in which consumption depends only on current income. Recent work on
credit constraints in rich countries has exploited the idea that under standard as-
sumptions and perfect capital markets, there should be no jump in consumption
associated with an anticipated increase in income. This paper applies that method-
ology to a large panel data set of South African households. Having established
that expenditure jumps are present, further evidence is presented indicating that
the jumps are more likely to be due to credit constraints than to precautionary
saving behaviour or myopic consumption.
Credit market imperfections are central to current development theory. And
in models of household behaviour in developing countries, such imperfections are
2frequently operationalised as a constraint on the amount of credit available to the
household (often taken to be zero). But given how often credit constraints are as-
sumed, there is little clear evidence of their presence. In his entry on development
economics in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Ray (2008) discusses
credit market failure and constrained credit as a key theme of the ﬁeld, but writes
that “[t]he direct empirical evidence on the existence of credit constraints is sur-
prisingly sparse”.
In fact, many observations that are consistent with credit constraints are ex-
plained equally well by myopia or precautionary saving. In particular, this applies
to observations that consumption responds to anticipated increases in income, as
well as to observations of ‘excess sensitivity’ of consumption with respect to tem-
porary income shocks that have only a small impact on permanent income. Apart
from the direct interest in establishing whether credit constraints are present, this
relates to the long-standing debate on whether poor households optimise within
their constraints (“poor but rational”) or not (Duﬂo 2006). Finding that the con-
sumption behaviour of poor households is not guided by forward planning could
have large consequences for the study of development.
This paper uses data on a large panel of black South African households to
investigate the response of expenditure to a large anticipated increase in income.
The public, non-contributory Old Age Pension scheme is widely known in the
population, and take-up amongst Africans is high and well predicted by age. An
approximate Euler equation is derived, from which it is clear that a jump in ex-
penditure associated with an anticipated increase in income is as consistent with
precautionary saving as it is with a binding credit constraint. The consumption
jump can also be explained by myopia. The prediction that consumption should
not respond to the anticipated income increase is empirically rejected, even when
allowing for household-speciﬁc trends. Furthermore, evidence is presented that
households are more likely to save when a member reaches the age of eligibility,
making the precautionary saving story less likely. Finally, a change in the age at
which the Child Support Grant lapses is used to identify an anticipated decrease
in household income. This allows for a test of credit constraints versus myopic
consumption behaviour. Credit constraints cannot be rejected in favour of myopic
consumption.
3The main contributions of this paper are as follows. It is one of a small number
of studies that provide explicit tests of the standard consumption model with per-
fect capital markets using expenditure data from a developing country. Uniquely,
the tests exploit a large panel data set and a large and highly anticipated source of
income. The use of ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation and clean identiﬁcation provides for a
robust rejection of the standard model with perfect capital markets amongst black
South Africans. This is also the ﬁrst paper to attempt to diﬀerentiate between
credit constraints, precautionary saving and myopic consumption as explanations
of expenditure jumps in a developing country. By showing that credit constraints
is a more likely explanation of household behaviour than non-forward-looking con-
sumption, the paper also contributes to the debate on whether people in developing
countries are ‘poor but rational’.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section provides an
overview of related literature. In the theory section, an approximate Euler equation
that incorporates credit constraints and a precautionary saving motive is derived
from a standard consumption model, and the relevant implications for empirical
work are drawn out. The evidence section provides background information about
the Old Age Pension and the Child Support Grant in South Africa and describes
the data before presenting the empirical speciﬁcations and results. Finally, there
is a brief conclusion.
2 Related literature
Hall (1978) extended the standard additive consumption model1 to the case with
stochastic earnings. The paper’s inﬂuential central ﬁnding is that, conditional on
today’s consumption, no other information available today is predictive of con-
sumption tomorrow.2 In other words, consumption should respond to income
changes only to the extent that these reﬂect changes in permanent income. This
1These models assume intertemporally additive utility, constant discount factors and con-
sumers who maximise (expected) present discounted utility over the remainder of the lifetime. I
follow Browning & Lusardi (1996) in referring to these as standard consumption models, though
their origins lie in Modigliani’s life-cycle and Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis models.
2Parker (1997) presents a consumption model that combines Hall’s (1978) framework with
the durable-goods model of Mankiw (1982), and derives similar predictions.
4prediction has subsequently been exploited by many economists to construct tests
of the perfect capital markets assumption. One line of research looks at the eﬀect
on consumption of anticipated or unanticipated changes in income (see Browning
& Lusardi (1996) for a review). Recently, two papers have argued that households
in the United States and Spain adjust their consumption in response to signiﬁ-
cant and regular changes in annual income, but not in response to irregular and
small payments because the computational cost of doing so outweighs the poten-
tial utility gain. Hsieh (2003) exploits the annual payout of petroleum dividends
to residents of Alaska as an anticipated change in permanent income. He does
not ﬁnd excess sensitivity of consumption related to the petroleum payout, but on
the other hand he conﬁrms earlier results when he ﬁnds that the same households
do over-react to tax refunds, which are smaller and harder to predict on aver-
age. Similarly, Browning & Collado (2001) ﬁnd that the consumption patterns of
Spanish households working in sectors with regular bonus payments do not diﬀer
signiﬁcantly from those of households in other sectors. The ﬁndings in this paper
go the other way, indicating that at least in one developing country context, the
standard model with perfect capital markets is rejected even with respect to a very
large and highly predictable increase in income.
Flavin (1985) tests credit constraints versus myopic consumption using data
from the United States, but relies on an instrumental variable technique and ag-
gregate data rather than a source of anticipated income in a panel of households.
Altonji & Siow (1987) wrote one of the ﬁrst papers to exploit the prediction that
forward-looking but credit-constrained agents should react diﬀerently to positive
and negative changes in income. This paper follows theirs in attempting to test
between myopic consumption and the standard model with and without credit
constraints, but they rely on an instrumental variables approach rather than a
well-known and speciﬁc source of anticipated income. They ﬁnd no strong evi-
dence of either credit constraints or myopic consumption in the American panel
they look at (PSID), whereas this paper provides a strong rejection of the standard
model with perfect capital markets in a panel of black South African households.
Deaton (1992) investigates how closely simple ‘rules of thumb’ can approximate
the optimal solution to the standard consumption model. These rules of thumb are
partly a function of current income and are thus related to myopic consumption
5as deﬁned here.
Deaton (1991) studies savings behaviour in the presence of credit constraints,
and uses simulations to study the eﬀectiveness of precautionary saving in smooth-
ing household consumption.
Banerjee (2003) surveys the evidence for capital market imperfections in de-
veloping countries. One of the most striking pieces of evidence he presents is a
wide dispersal between interest rates on saving and borrowing in many parts of the
developing world. Banerjee & Duﬂo (2005) call this ‘suggestive, albeit indirect,
evidence of credit constraints’.
One of the few articles to provide a direct test of a prediction from the standard
consumption model in a developing country is by Paxson (1992). The starting
point for her inﬂuential paper is the prediction that the propensity to consume
unexpected income should be much smaller than that for expected income. In
other words, a large proportion of windfall gains should be saved. In line with the
prediction, she ﬁnds that saving amongst agricultural households in Thailand is
responsive to positive income shocks resulting from rainfall variation. Rosenzweig
& Wolpin (1993) ﬁnd evidence of credit constraints among farmers in India, and
Banerjee & Duﬂo (2008) do the same for Indian ﬁrms. Morduch (1990) tests for
credit constraints in rural India.
One strand of the literature looks at self-reported credit constraints. Typically,
respondents are ﬂagged as credit-constrained either if they report having tried
to borrow and being refused, or if they report being discouraged from applying
for credit because they thought they would be refused. For instance, Barham,
Boucher & Carter (1996) uses this type of survey information to look at whether the
presence of credit co-operatives in regions of Guatemala relaxes credit constraints.
Rasmussen (2002) takes a similar approach using data from South Africa. She ﬁnds
that a high proportion of the households in her sample are credit-constrained.
There is a growing body of literature exploiting the South African Old Age
Pension as a source of exogenous income variation. Case & Deaton (1998) look at
how various expenditure categories respond to the pension income, but they do
not analyse total expenditure, nor do they focus on credit constraints. Edmonds
(2006) ﬁnds that receiving the pension leads to a decrease in child labour and an
increase in school attendance. Duﬂo (2003) ﬁnds that young girls living with a
6pension-eligible grandmother are in better health than those who do not. Both
Edmonds and Duﬂo argue that their ﬁndings are indicative of credit constraints.
But their use of cross-section data rules out household ﬁxed eﬀects, and they do
not attempt to rule out myopic consumption as an alternative explanation of their
ﬁndings.
3 Consumption with credit constraints and in-
come uncertainty
An agent lives for T periods. In each period t she receives an income
yi = yi + εi,
where yi is deterministic (but may vary over time) and εi is a series of shocks with
expectation 0. Income is the only source of uncertainty in the model. The agent







wi = Rwi−1 + yi − ci
wi ≥ 0
for t ≤ i ≤ T. Here, δ ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, R is the gross interest rate and
wt denotes the agent’s wealth at the end of period t. Instant utility u is a function
of consumption ct and household characteristics Zt. For simplicity, household
characteristics are assumed to evolve deterministically. The instant utility function
is three times diﬀerentiable with respect to consumption and satisﬁes u  > 0,
u   < 0a n du    ≥ 0. (Here and later, primes indicate diﬀerentiation with respect
to consumption.) Concavity implies risk aversion, while a positive third derivative
gives the agent a precautionary saving motive.
7The ﬁrst constraint is just the evolution of wealth: wealth at the end of period
i, wi, is the wealth remaining at the end of the previous period, wi−1, augmented
by the gross interest rate R, and adjusted for current-period labour income yi and
consumption. The second is the credit constraint: the requirement that wealth
is non-negative at the end of every period implies that the agent cannot borrow.
Note, however, that the following analysis is robust to allowing some borrowing,
i.e. a negative rather than a zero lower bound on wealth.
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to consumption at time t yields the Euler
equation
u
  (ct,Z t)=δREt u
  (ct+1,Z t+1)+λt,
where λt is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier for the credit constraint. λt is always
non-negative, and it is positive when the credit constraint binds in period t.
Because of the uncertainty in future income, there will be uncertainty in future
consumption. Consumption uncertainty cannot be made precise at this level of
generality, but it is always possible to write
ci = ci + ei
for future periods i with ci =E t ci and Et ei =0 . D e n o t eσ2
i =V a r ( ei). Then a
Taylor expansion and taking expectations yield
u
  (ct,Z t) ≈ δR

u





    (ct+1,Z t+1)

+ λt.
Rearranging gives the approximate Euler equation
u
  (ct,Z t) − δRu





    (ct+1,Z t+1)+λt. (1)
This equation is informative of the expected evolution of consumption, and its
interpretation motivates the empirical speciﬁcation used in this paper.
83.1 Implications
Since u  > 0a n du   < 0, the left-hand side of (1) is positively related to the ex-
pected increase in consumption between periods t and t+1. If there were no credit
constraints, no uncertainty and no changes in the household characteristics, the
right-hand side would be zero and consumption would evolve smoothly according
to the shape of the utility function and the magnitude of δR. A higher discount
factor δ (‘more patience’) or a higher interest rate R tends to decrease today’s
consumption relative to that of tomorrow.
A binding credit constraint, λt > 0, introduces a positive term on the right-
hand side and therefore tends to reduce current consumption relative to future
consumption. Uncertainty in future consumption will also reduce current con-
sumption relative to the future (precautionary saving). Changes in household
characteristics also inﬂuence the consumption path.
Several previous empirical tests of the standard consumption model with per-
fect credit markets have relied on the prediction that only lifetime wealth should
matter, and therefore an anticipated change in income should not have any ef-
fect on consumption. Rejections of this prediction have been taken as evidence
of credit constraints. In the light of (1) it is clear that such constraints are in-
deed a possible explanation for a change in consumption levels associated with an
anticipated change in income. A household that expects an increase in income
would, in the absence of credit constraints, smooth its consumption by borrowing
before the higher income stream begins. But a credit constraint may prevent the
consumption increase from happening until the higher income is realised. In terms
of the equation, recall that a binding credit constraint is associated with λt > 0,
and that λt = 0 corresponds to the absence of a binding constraint in period t.
Clearly, a binding constraint is associated with a steeper increase in consumption.
However, (1) makes it clear that a break in the household consumption path at
the time of an anticipated income increase can also be due to a change in consump-
tion uncertainty. The above framework is too general to study this eﬀect precisely,
but it seems plausible that the increase in income can reduce the household’s need
for buﬀer savings and thereby allow consumption to increase.
Though a jump in consumption can be explained by either credit constraints or
9a reduction in buﬀer savings, looking at the stock of savings should help distinguish
between the two mechanisms. A credit-constrained household will necessarily re-
duce its savings to zero in the period before the income increase (otherwise the
constraint would not be binding), so that savings will either stay constant at zero
or increase when income increases. By contrast, if the jump in expenditure is due
to a reduced need for buﬀer savings, then clearly savings could decrease at the
time of the increase in income.
A break in the household consumption path may also be observed if the above
model is misspeciﬁed. The core assumptions of the standard consumption model
are that utility is temporally additive and that consumers maximise expected util-
ity. This can be contrasted with a myopic consumption model, a basic version of
which stipulates that households consume a ﬁxed proportion of their disposable in-
come. Considered as a theory of household behaviour, this may be simplistic. But
it does capture a sense of myopia or lack of forward planning, and can therefore
serve as a benchmark against which to measure the meticulously planning house-
holds of the standard models. Speciﬁcally, the consumption of a myopic household
will track that of its income, regardless of whether income increases or decreases,
and regardless of whether the change is anticipated or not.
The above framework rules out borrowing, but not saving (otherwise the house-
hold would simply consume its income in each period). This is probably realistic,
though the return on savings may be low and uncertain. This gives rise to an
asymmetry of predictions: in the presence of constraints on credit (but not on
savings), an anticipated increase in income may be associated with a simultane-
ous increase in consumption. But an anticipated decrease in income, other things
equal, should not be accompanied by a steep drop in consumption in the standard
model, because the household is able to smooth its consumption proﬁle by ﬁrst
accumulating and then drawing down savings. In contrast, the consumption of a
myopic household will track income across both increases and decreases.
The rest of this paper documents a jump in expenditure associated with an
anticipated increase in income, and then attempts to explain this observation.
Panel data allow the use of household ﬁxed eﬀects to take account of time-invariant,
household-speciﬁc consumption determinants. This makes it possible to focus
on credit constraints, precautionary saving and myopic consumption as possible
10explanations for the observed behaviour.
4 Evidence
4.1 The Old Age Pension and the Child Support Grant
The South African Old Age Pension is a non-contributory, means-tested public
beneﬁt scheme, originally set up in the 1920s to provide a retirement income for
the minority of white workers who did not have pension arrangements through their
employer. In 1989, the government committed to removing racial inequalities in the
system, and from 1993 onwards the new scheme was fully operational throughout
the country. In rural areas, the money is distributed from a sophisticated network
of mobile paypoints reaching each beneﬁciary once a month. Today, the pension
is a major source of income3 amongst the poor all over the country, and in many
households the main breadwinner is an Old Age Pensioner. See Case & Deaton
(1998) for more detail.
To qualify for the pension, the applicant has to be old enough and also pass a
means test. Only people whose wealth and income are below certain levels qual-
ify. The means test is set at a level where most white elderly fail to qualify, but
a large majority of black elderly easily pass the hurdle. Hence for black people
the pension can largely be regarded as a universally available and secure monthly
income stream, beginning at the lower qualifying age (60 for women, 65 for men)
and continuing until death. It is independent of the economic situation of family
members, except the spouse for married pensioners. From an econometric perspec-
tive, it provides a convenient source of nearly exogenous income variation amongst
people around the qualifying age.
Given its popularity, reach and ﬁnancial importance, the pension is a highly
anticipated source of income. The qualifying age limits are also widely known
(Duﬂo 2003, Case & Deaton 1998).
The Child Support Grant was introduced in 1998 to replace the earlier state
3In 2000, the pension paid out ZAR 540 per month. This is approximately 1.7 times the
median per-capita total black household income of ZAR 320 per month computed from the
Income and Expenditure Survey 2000.
11maintenance grant. It is paid to the primary care-giver (usually the mother) of
young children. It is in principle means-tested, and a large proportion of black
mothers with age-eligible children qualify. Initially it only covered children up to
and including the age of six, but from 2002 there was a gradual expansion to older
children. For the 2001 and 2002 surveys used in this study, the upper age limit
was six years. When the 2003 survey was conducted, the upper age limit was
eight years. Grant take-up increased rapidly during the period studied, in part
due to considerable eﬀort by the government. In 2002, the grant paid out ZAR
110 per month per child, which is more than one-third of the median per capita
household income amongst blacks. Rosa & Mpokotho (2004) provide more detail
on the Child Support Grant.
4.2 Data
Since 2000, Statistics South Africa has conducted a Labour Force Survey twice
a year. It is designed as a rotating panel survey, but the longest series of longi-
tudinal household observations is substantially shorter than it could have been,
due to several ‘fresh starts’ in which completely new samples were drawn. This
study uses the September 2001, September 2002 and September 2003 waves of the
survey. The surveys are nationally representative. Only households headed by a
black (‘African’, in South African terminology) person are considered here. After
dropping 175 households due to missing data on the gender, age or population
group of one or more household members, there remains 36,192 households in the
panel, of which 11,964 are observed twice and 6,651 are observed three times.
An expenditure variable was constructed as follows. In each of the survey
rounds the households were asked, “What was the total household expenditure
in the last month? Include everything that the household and its members spent
money on, including food, clothing, transport, rent and rates, alcohol and tobacco,
school fees, entertainment and any other expenses.” The answer options were: R
0–399, R 400–799, R 800–1,199, R 1,200–1,799, R 1,800–2,499, R 2,500–4,999,
R 5,000–9,999, R 10,000 or more, “Don’t know” or “Refuse”. The expenditure
variable used in this paper was constructed by taking the midpoint of each interval.
For the “R 10,000 or more” option, expenditure was set to R 15,000. The last two
12response options were coded as missing values. It is the logarithm of the resulting
number that is used here as the measure of monthly household expenditure.
A household is coded as age-eligible for the Old Age Pension if there is at least
one woman aged 60+ or one man aged 65+ in the household, and age-eligible for
the Child Support Grant if at least one child below the upper age limit is present
in the household at the time of observation. The validity of age eligibility as a
predictor of take-up is conﬁrmed in Figure 1, where take-up of the Old Age Pension
is plotted against the age of the oldest male and female household members. Age
eligibility is clearly a strong predictor of pension take-up, though perhaps more
cleanly for women than for men.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. Most of the variables appear
to be stable over time, but the increasing take-up of the Child Support Grant is
discernible.
For the analysis reported in Figure 4 only, data from the Income and Expen-
diture Survey 2000 were used instead.
4.3 Testing the unconstrained standard model
This section looks at how household expenditure responds to the anticipated in-
come stream from the Old Age Pension. The results can be previewed in Figure
2, in which the logarithm of monthly household expenditure is plotted against the
age of the oldest female and male household members. For both sexes, expenditure
increases from the age of 20 until it reaches a maximum around the age of 40 for
women and a few years later for men, after which it decreases. However, at 60,
the age of female pension eligibility, there is a clear break and expenditure as a
function of the age of the oldest female seems to rise rapidly before levelling oﬀ.
There is a similar trend break for men around the age of 65, though again the
onset is perhaps not as cleanly deﬁned.
The main empirical speciﬁcation is given by
Yit = αi + μt + γLit + Xitβ + εit.
Here, Yit is the expenditure of household i at time (survey) t. On the right-hand
side, αi is a household ﬁxed eﬀect, μt is a time ﬁxed eﬀect, and Lit is an indicator
13for whether household i receives, or is age-eligible for, the Old Age Pension in year
t. Xit is a vector of control variables, and εit is the error term.
The coeﬃcient of interest is γ. Given the speciﬁcation, it is only identiﬁed
within households that move from a non-pension to a pension state or vice versa.
Disregarding deaths and other changes in household composition, this will only
happen when a female household member turns 60, or a male household member
turns 65. In the eligibility speciﬁcation, the identifying assumption is that condi-
tional on household demographics and other controls there is nothing special about
turning 60/65 other than that one becomes eligible for the Old Age Pension. This
assumes that all other changes to do with ‘entering retirement’ are either a direct
consequence of qualifying for the pension, or are controlled for in the regression.
Throughout the analyses, age eligibility rather than actual take-up will be the
preferred right-hand-side variable. This is due to possible endogeneity in the take-
up decision: it may be that a person’s decision about when to apply for the Old
Age Pension is co-determined with other unobserved characteristics that may also
impinge on expenditure.
The main results are presented in Table 2. All regressions, here and later,
include household and time ﬁxed eﬀects, and standard errors are robust and clus-
tered at the level of the primary sampling unit.
In column 1, household expenditure is regressed on a dummy variable indicating
whether the household receives the Old Age Pension (1) or not (0). The coeﬃcient
of interest is positive at .195 and highly signiﬁcant. This suggests that receipt of
the pension increases a household’s expenditure by approximately 20%. Column
2 regresses expenditure on a binary indicator for whether at least one household
member is age-eligible for the pension. The coeﬃcient drops to .159 but remains
highly signiﬁcant. In column 3, variables indicating the presence of male and
female age-eligible household members are included separately. The male and
female eligibility coeﬃcients are .147 and .159, respectively. Both are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, but they are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other.
All these coeﬃcients are estimated within households. The ﬁxed eﬀects control
for unobservables that are invariant over time, but previous work has suggested
that household composition can change in response to pension receipt (Edmonds,
Mammen & Miller 2004). It has been suggested that mothers with young children
14are more likely to move in with the grandmother when the latter starts receiving
the Old Age Pension, while mothers with older children may leave their children
in the care of the grandmother and migrate for work.
This is not a problem for the present purposes, since the main right-hand-
side variable, age eligibility, is exogenous to such changes. Changes in household
composition is a consumer choice, and if they occur at the time of pension eligibility
then that is arguably another indication of credit constraints: if it were possible
to smooth consumption, it would not be necessary to wait for pension eligibility in
order to eﬀectuate changes in household composition. Nevertheless, in column 4 a
full set of household demographics are included, namely separate variables for the
number of male and female family members in the age groups 0–4, 5–14, 15–24, 25–
34, 35–44, 45–54 and 55+. The coeﬃcient drops to 0.074 but remains signiﬁcant
at the 1% level. The drop in magnitude suggests that about half the observed
increase in expenditure at the age of pension eligibility is related to changes in
household composition.
This paper uses expenditure as the main dependent variable, whereas the the-
ory’s predictions are in terms of consumption. The two are often the same. How-
ever, given the imprecise wording of the survey question on which the expenditure
variable is based, there is a possibility that the expenditure data used may include
debt repayment. There may therefore be a concern that the observed increase in
expenditure at the age of pension eligibility may reﬂect the repayment of loans
rather than an increase in consumption. However, there are no data on debt prin-
cipal or repayment with which to investigate this. But households were asked
whether they, in the 12 months prior to the interview, incurred any debt, and
also whether there is a mortgage on their dwelling. One may therefore attempt to
study the expenditure of households without debt by focusing on the subsample of
observations where no debt had been incurred in the past 24 months, and where
the dwelling is not mortgaged at any observed point. This rules out short-term
debt and the most important type of long-term debt, though non-mortgage debts
incurred more than 24 months ago and still outstanding cannot be ruled out.
The restriction reduces the sample size dramatically, but for the remaining
households consumption should be closely aligned with expenditure. The results
of this regression are reported in column 5. The coeﬃcient remains signiﬁcant,
15and is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the full-sample result.
Though the regressions reported so far allow for household ﬁxed eﬀects, the
Euler equation suggests that households may be on diﬀerent consumption trends
depending on their discount factor and/or household characteristics. Because some
households are observed three times, it is possible to put ﬁrst-diﬀerenced expen-
diture on the left-hand side. The household ﬁxed eﬀects would then capture id-
iosyncratic household trends, and the regression would test for whether pension
eligibility leads to a break in expenditure trend. The result of this regression is
reported in column 6, and the highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of .258 indicates that
becoming eligible for the pension increases the year-on-year growth in consumption
by as much as 29%.
The expenditure variable was also regressed on annual demographic variables
for household members within ﬁve years of the qualifying age. For each integer
n from -5 to 5, a variable was constructed that counts the number of household
members no more than n years younger than the qualifying age. Thus the variable
indexed by n = −5 equals the number of women aged 55 or more plus the number
of men aged 60 or more, and the variable indexed by n = 0 counts the number of
household members who qualify for the pension. If qualifying for the pension is
linked to increased expenditure but general ageing in this window is not, then one
would expect the coeﬃcient on the variable indexed by n = 0 to be positive, but
none of the others.
The results of this regression are presented graphically in Figure 3. The es-
timated coeﬃcients are marked by dots, and the bars show the 95% conﬁdence
intervals. It is clear that only the coeﬃcient at the qualifying age (n =0 )i s
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, and it is positive. The regression also included
household and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Running separate regressions by sex (not re-
ported) yield equivalent results for women, whereas in the male-only speciﬁcation
none of the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant.
There may remain a concern that the distinction between consumption and
expenditure is not adequately addressed. Therefore, an analysis similar to the one
in Figure 3 was undertaken using a diﬀerent data set. The Income and Expenditure
Survey 2000 breaks down ﬁnancial transactions in more detail, so that it is possible
to create a consumption variable that explicitly excludes loan payments or deposits
16into saving/investment accounts. However, this variable is only available in a cross-
section, implying that computing within-household estimates are not possible. The
logarithm of annual consumption was regressed on the same set of variables as
before, and the results are presented in Figure 4. Standard errors were again
robust and clustered at the level of the primary sampling unit.
It is clear that the only variable that is signiﬁcant is at +1, and it is positive.
This implies that having a female aged 61+ or a male aged 66+ signiﬁcantly
increases consumption relative to younger age groups. Though this indicates the
presence of a positive discontinuity in consumption as expected, it does seem
to occur one year after the qualifying age as opposed to simultaneously with it.
A possible explanation for this relates to the way age information was collected
for this survey. As well as age, the year of birth was recorded. But it appears
that rather than collecting age information separately, it has been calculated by
subtracting the year of birth from the year of the survey (2000). However, since the
survey took place in October, this will overstate the age for a signiﬁcant proportion
of the sample. It is therefore likely that some people recorded as being 61 years of
age were in fact only 60 at the time of the survey.4
Because the cross-sectional data set rules out household ﬁxed eﬀects, a similar
regression was also run in which household demographics (the same set of variables
as before) were controlled for, along with two binary variables indicating the level
of education of the household head (indicators for having any education at all and
having completed high school). The qualitative results did not change. As above,
when the regression was run separately for men and women, the qualitative result
was retained for women, but for men there were no signiﬁcant coeﬃcients.
In order to interpret these results, refer back to the Euler equation (1). Basic
household demographics are controlled for in column 5, so these cannot account
for the expenditure response. Though it is diﬃcult to rule out unobserved charac-
teristics that change over time, the household ﬁxed eﬀects capture anything that
is time-invariant at the household level. The Euler terms involving the discount
4If one assumes that the survey was done in mid-October, and birthdays are uniformly dis-
tributed across the year, then 12.5% of the population will not yet have had their birthday in
the current year. However, in the survey less than 2% of household members appear to not yet
have had their birthdays in the survey year, suggesting that age has been understated by one
year for a signiﬁcant proportion of the sample. This could explain the regression result.
17factor and interest rate may be responsible for an increasing or decreasing trend
in expenditure, though the year ﬁxed eﬀects will capture any changes that aﬀect
the sample as a whole and the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced results allow for household-speciﬁc
trends.
The results presented here indicate that expenditure responds forcefully to
pension age eligibility. The standard explanation for this observation would be that
the households faced binding credit constraints the previous year. But if qualifying
for the pension is associated with a decrease in consumption uncertainty (which
seems likely) as well as an increase in income, then these results cannot rule out
the possibility that the observed change in consumption is due to a reduced need
for precautionary saving: households that previously saved for a rainy day may
dissave once they receive the pension, and this may boost expenditure. Finally,
myopic consumption that simply tracks income can also explain these ﬁndings.
Some readers may be concerned that a major life change (‘retirement’) might
systematically coincide with the qualifying age for the pension and bias the results.
However, for the majority of the black population who are either unemployed or
employed in the informal sector, there is no well-deﬁned concept of ‘retirement’ in
the sense of reaching the end of an employment contract. This is illustrated by the
fact that only 2.6% of black women in the 60–64 age group receive employment-
related pensions, and the equivalent number for black men in the 65–69 age group
is 7.2%. If anything, withdrawal from the labour market is much more likely to
be caused by the Old Age Pension income (Ranchhod 2006), or to have already
happened (Bertrand, Mullainathan & Miller 2003), than to coincide with it in a
way that might bias the identiﬁed eﬀect on consumption.
4.4 Credit constraints versus precautionary saving
Within the general consumption theory outlined earlier in this paper, the results so
far are compatible with either credit constraints or precautionary saving, or both.
If a household is fairly certain of an increase in future income, it would be expected
to smooth consumption by borrowing before the change. But income from the Old
Age Pension is not just sizeable, it is also guaranteed for life. Employment income
is probably uncertain in comparison, especially in the informal labour market.
18Therefore, becoming eligible for the pension is likely to be associated with increased
consumption security and a reduced need for precautionary saving. A reduction in
the need for buﬀer savings may increase consumption around the time of pension
eligibility even in the absence of credit constraints.
However, a consideration of household savings may allow a distinction to be
made. If the jump in expenditure is solely due to credit constraints, then one
would expect the household to draw down savings in anticipation of becoming
eligible for the pension. In the absence of uncertainty, the household will as far as
possible try to smooth consumption across the income discontinuity, and this is
inconsistent with maintaining positive savings. Put diﬀerently, a credit constraint
cannot truly bind as long as savings are positive. With a binding credit constraint,
pension take-up should therefore be associated with an increase, or at least not a
decrease, in household savings.
On the other hand, assume that the jump in consumption is entirely due to
precautionary saving. Entering a phase of greater consumption certainty reduces
the need to keep a buﬀer of savings. Therefore, the prediction is a fall in savings.
This suggests a way to distinguish between the two mechanisms: if behaviour is
primarily guided by a credit constraint, savings would be either constant (at zero)
or increase when income increases. By contrast, if the expenditure response to
increased income is due to precautionary saving, then household savings could
decrease when income increases.
Only binary information on savings is available, in the form of the household’s
response to the question “Does this household, or a household member, own any
of the following ﬁnancial assets?” Yes/no responses are provided to each of the
following options: bank savings accounts, stokvels (ROSCAs), pension plans or
retirement annuities, unit trusts, stocks or shares, cash loans expected to be repaid,
life insurance, or any other savings. It is therefore possible to construct an overall
savings indicator as follows: the household is coded as having savings (of some
form) if it answered ‘yes’ to at least one of these options, and otherwise not.
Clearly, the analysis is limited to identifying households that move from being
savers to non-savers or vice versa. Households that adjust their amount of savings
from one positive amount to another cannot be discerned from those that do not
adjust their (positive) savings at all.
19Table 3 presents the results of regressions where the dependent variable is the
binary savings indicator. The precautionary saving story predicts a reduction in
savings, while the credit constraints hypothesis predicts either no change or an
increase in household savings. It is therefore natural to take the credit constraints
story as the null hypothesis in these regressions, to be rejected in favour of pre-
cautionary saving if the coeﬃcient on pension take-up or eligibility is negative and
signiﬁcant.
Regressing the savings indicator on pension take-up in column 1 yields a highly
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of .07. Regressing the savings indicator on pension eligibility
in column 2 results in a smaller coeﬃcient of .037, but it remains signiﬁcant at the
1% level. In column 3, male and female age eligibility are considered separately.
The female coeﬃcient is .039 and highly signiﬁcant, whereas the male coeﬃcient
drops to .023 and is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Column 4 presents
the results of a regression in which the sample is restricted to observations of
households that did not incur any debt in the last 12 months prior to the survey.
The coeﬃcient on pension eligibility is .033 and marginally signiﬁcant. Including
a full set of household controls and using the full sample in column 5 results in a
positive coeﬃcient of .018, but it is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
One potential issue with these ﬁndings is related to how the respondents under-
stand the question about savings, in particular the last option, ‘Any other savings’.
There may be a tendency not to count modest amounts of cash kept in a purse
or wallet as savings, whereas the same amount held in a bank account may be
thought of as such. The resulting measurement error may lead to under-reporting
of savings for those households that do not use a bank account or other non-cash
savings technologies. If households are less likely to hold their savings in cash after
the increase in income, then an estimate of the eﬀect of the income on savings may
be biased upwards. However, using ‘Any other savings’ as the dependent variable
does not change the results substantially (not reported).
In summary, the savings indicator seems to increase or stay constant in response
to the increased income. There is therefore no evidence of a decline in savings at
the age of pension eligibility, and the null hypothesis of credit constraints cannot
be rejected in favour of precautionary saving.
204.5 Credit constraints versus myopic consumption
Above, it was found that household expenditure, even when de-trended, responds
positively to an anticipated increase in income. Moreover, the response of house-
hold savings to the anticipated increase in income seems to point in the direction
of credit constraints rather than precautionary saving as an explanation. How-
ever, this conclusion still rests on the assumptions of the standard model from
which the Euler equation was derived. In this section, the aim is to contrast the
general framework of forward-looking but credit-constrained households with the
stark myopic alternative in which households simply consume a ﬁxed fraction of
their income.
More advanced versions of myopic consumption models are considered in the
literature, but they share the critical feature that current consumption is a positive
function of current-period income. Deaton (1992) considers several rules of thumb
of this type, of which his benchmark rule is ‘consume all cash on hand up to mean
income, and 30 per cent of any excess’.
A myopic model of consumption compares well to the standard model as far
as the results so far are concerned: for myopic households, an increase in income
is accompanied by an increase in consumption, even if the change is anticipated.
Furthermore, if consumption is a ﬁxed proportion of income, and savings are the
diﬀerence between income and consumption, then savings must also be a ﬁxed pro-
portion of income. Therefore, the basic myopic consumption model predicts that
household savings will increase when income does. This prediction is supported
by the ﬁndings in the previous section.
But an anticipated reduction in income may help distinguish between the mod-
els: if consumers are credit-constrained but forward-looking, then an anticipated
decrease in income should not have any eﬀect on expenditure because the tech-
nology required to smooth consumption is savings, not credit. In contrast, the
myopic consumption model predicts that expenditure should decrease in line with
income.
It is important to be clear that this strategy of diﬀerentiating between credit
constraints and myopic consumption relies on the presence of an eﬀective savings
technology. Besley (1995) provides a number of reasons why savings may not be an
21available or attractive way to achieve smooth consumption in a typical developing
country. Anyone can save cash at home or on their person, but the expected
return on savings may be zero or negative if there is a considerable risk of loss,
appropriation by other household members or theft. Even during apartheid, the
South African post oﬃce oﬀered a savings account that was available to the whole
population. But it is possible that distance or transport cost to the nearest branch,
mistrust in the system or illiteracy may have made this product unattractive to
many potential savers. Since the end of apartheid, most if not all banks have oﬀered
savings accounts available to anyone, though high fees and fear of intimidation may
still act as barriers. Informal savings devices, for example in the form of stokvels
(ROSCAs), remain popular amongst black South Africans. Taken together, it
seems reasonable to assume that some savings technology was available to the
black population in the period studied, even if returns may have been low. This is
supported by the observation that in the sample, 48% of households report having
savings in some form.
The South African Child Support Grant is available to ‘primary carers’ (pre-
dominantly mothers) of young children. There is a means test that will be ignored
here because most black households easily pass it. Instead, the focus is once again
on the age cut-oﬀs. Originally, the grant covered any number of biological children
up to and including the age of six. So as a ﬁrst pass, one could look for a drop in
household expenditure when children turn seven. If there is such a drop, it could
be taken as evidence for myopic behaviour rather than credit constraints.
But this is not entirely satisfactory. In the previous section, identiﬁcation
relied partly on the assumption that households where a 59-year-old woman (or
64-year-old man) is present is not substantially diﬀerent from a household with a
60-year-old woman (or 65-year-old man), except that the latter household would
be age-eligible for the Old Age Pension. It is less clear that a child with a six-year-
old is comparable to a seven-year-old. Young children develop fast and progress
through the educational system, so arguably an age diﬀerence of a single year
may be associated with considerable changes in household behaviour even if other
circumstances were ﬁxed.
For this reason, a change in the age cut-oﬀ for the Child Support Grant will
be exploited. From 1 April 2003, the upper age limit went up from six to eight
22years. So in the ﬁrst two rounds of the survey data, collected in September 2001
and September 2002, only households with children up to and including six years
old were age-eligible for a Child Support Grant. But in the ﬁnal round used here,
conducted in September 2003, households with children up to and including eight
years old were age-eligible.
The situation is illustrated in Figure 5, which shows the proportion of house-
holds reporting receipt of the Child Support Grant as a function of the age of
the youngest household member. Perhaps the ﬁrst thing one notices is the rapid
expansion in take-up of the grant in the period. For households in which the
youngest child is aged 0–6 years, take-up in 2003 was greater than it was in 2002,
which in turn was greater than it was in 2001. But the change in the upper age
limit for grant eligibility is also clearly visible: in 2001 and 2002, when children up
to and including the age of six were eligible, take-up was very low for households
in which the youngest child was seven or older. In 2003, when children aged up to
and including eight were eligible, similarly low take-up rates are not reached until
age nine. The identiﬁcation of the results presented in this section relies on this
change in the eligibility of seven-year-olds between 2002 and 2003.
The validity of the identiﬁcation is conﬁrmed in Table 4. A binary variable
indicating whether a household had taken up the Child Support Grant is regressed
on the number of children aged seven in the household and an interaction of this
variable with an indicator for the year 2003. The identiﬁcation strategy rests on
the assumption that households with seven-year-olds in 2003 are more likely to
be in receipt of the Child Support Grant than households with seven-year-olds in
2002, because the former are eligible for the grant whereas the latter are not. This
is borne out by the results presented in columns 1–3. Column 1 presents the basic
result. Annual and household ﬁxed eﬀects are controlled for throughout, as before.
Column 2 adds yearly count variables for children aged 0–9, and column 3 adds
general household demographics. The coeﬃcient is positive and highly signiﬁcant
throughout.
If the household consumption pattern is determined by myopia, then expen-
diture for a household with a child aged seven in 2003 should be higher than the
expenditure for a household with a child aged seven in 2002, because only the
former household is eligible for the grant. For forward-looking households that
23may face constraints on credit but not on savings, the presence of a seven-year-old
in 2003 should have the same impact on consumption as the presence of a seven-
year-old in 2002. It is true that the former may expect higher lifetime earnings,
but this should be captured by a household ﬁxed eﬀect, and any macro-trend is
captured by year ﬁxed eﬀects.
To test the null hypothesis of forward-looking households, a regression of the
form
Yit = αi + μt + γCit + δCit ∗ It=2003 + Xitβ + εit
was run. Here, Cit denotes the presence of a child age seven in household i and
year t. The indicator It=2003 is 1 if t = 2003 and 0 otherwise. If households are
subject to constraints on credit but not on savings, the coeﬃcient δ should be zero:
there is no diﬀerence between the consumption behaviour of a household with a
child who turns seven in 2002, and that of a household with a child who turns
seven in 2003, apart from what can be explained by the household ﬁxed eﬀect,
the macro-trend or changes in other characteristics. But myopic households will
reduce consumption in line with the lapse of the Child Support Grant. Therefore, a
household with a seven-year-old in 2002 should decrease its consumption compared
to the previous year, whereas a household with a seven-year-old in 2003 should
not. In other terms, the coeﬃcient δ is zero under the standard model with credit
constraints, and positive under the myopic model.
Table 4 presents the results of this regression. In column 4, the regression
is run without control variables apart from household and survey ﬁxed eﬀects.
The coeﬃcient of interest is negative but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
In column, 5 further controls are added in the form of variables counting the
number of children in age categories from zero up to nine years of age. The
coeﬃcient of interest is still not signiﬁcant. In column 6, household demographics
are added as control variables, but the coeﬃcient of interest changes little and
remains insigniﬁcant.
Thus the coeﬃcient is negative and insigniﬁcant for all three regressions. So the
null hypothesis of a standard model with forward-looking households and credit
constraints cannot be rejected in favour of the myopic consumption model.
Though it is likely that the relevant population was reasonably well informed of
24the basic qualifying requirements for the Child Support Grant, the above analysis
implicitly assumes that the change in the qualifying age was also known. The
analysis does not permit a distinction between the behaviour of forward-looking
but ’surprised’ households that learnt that their seven-year-olds were still receiving
the grant in 2003, from that of myopic (non-forward-looking) households. Both
types of households would be expected to consume more than their counterparts in
2002. The results presented here, a negative coeﬃcient not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero, are therefore indicative of forward-looking households that were aware
of the changes in the rules. This is probably realistic and reﬂects the importance
of the grant in South African society.
5 Conclusion
Many economists are quick to point to credit constraints when they suspect fail-
ures of the standard consumption model. Indeed, the assumption of constrained
credit is a staple of economic development theory. Yet direct and rigorous tests
of this assumption, of the type that has recently gained popularity in analyses
of rich-country data, are scarce. Moreover, many ﬁndings consistent with credit
constraints are equally compatible with precautionary savings or myopic consump-
tion. This paper tests and rejects the standard model with perfect capital markets
using data on a panel of black South African households. It is one of the ﬁrst pa-
pers to present evidence that credit constraints, rather than precautionary saving
or myopic consumption, drive the observed excess sensitivity of consumption to
anticipated income changes in a development context.
At the micro-level, ineﬃcient credit markets hamper consumption smoothing
and restrain production through ineﬃcient allocation of resources and investments.
At the macro-level, these investment misallocations are widely believed to im-
pede growth. Credit markets matter for development, and eﬀective development
policy must be sensitive to the precise mechanisms that determine consumption
behaviour.
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28The thick line shows the fraction of households that receive the Old Age Pension, as a 
function of the age of the oldest female household member. In order to focus on take-up as 
a function of female eligibility, households with men aged 55+ are excluded from this 
graph. Similarly, the thin line shows the household take-up rate of the pension as a 
function of the age of the oldest male household member. Households with women aged 
55+ are excluded from the graph. Recall that women are age-eligible from the age of 60, 
and men from the age of 65 Age eligibility is clearly a strong predictor of pension take-up
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and men from the age of 65. Age eligibility is clearly a strong predictor of pension take-up. 
The data is from the September 2003 survey.The thick (thin) line shows the average of the logarithm of monthly expenditure as a 
function of the age of the oldest female (male) household member. The chart pools data 
for all three survey waves.
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female maleThe plot is similar to Figure 3, but based on data from the 2000 Income and Expenditure 
Survey. This makes it easier to isolate consumption as opposed to expenditure, but the 
data are only cross-sectional. The above chart is based on a regression of log annual 
household expenditure on household members a certain number of years away from 
pension qualification. Including household demographics and education of the household 
head does not change the qualitative result that the variable at +1 is positive and uniquely 
significant. The significance at +1 rather than at 0 may be due to age being systematically 
understated in the survey The regression pools data on men and women
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understated in the survey. The regression pools data on men and women.The plot is similar to Figure 3, but based on data from the 2000 Income and Expenditure 
Survey. This makes it easier to isolate consumption as opposed to expenditure, but the 
data are only cross-sectional. The above chart is based on a regression of log annual 
household expenditure on household members a certain number of years away from 
pension qualification. Including household demographics and education of the household 
head does not change the qualitative result that the variable at +1 is positive and uniquely 
significant. The significance at +1 rather than at 0 may be due to age being systematically 
understated in the survey The regression pools data on men and women



























Age relative to qualifying age
understated in the survey. The regression pools data on men and women.The take-up rate of the Child Support Grant, by the age of the youngest child. The rapidly 
increasing popularity of the programme between 2001 and 2003 is clear, as is the 
expansion in age eligibility from 0-6 years in 2001 and 2002 to 0-8 years in 2003.














Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
2001 2002 2003
Log monthly expenditure 6.22 6.28 6.40
  
The household receives the Old Age Pension 0.20 0.21 0.21
	 	
 	





A female household member is age-eligible for the pension 0.18 0.18 0.18
  




The household receives the Child Support Grant 0.06 0.10 0.17
  





Household size 3.98 3.98 3.76
  

Observations 21,096         20,026        20,336       
Number of observations 61,458        
Linear regressions. The dependent variable is 1 if the househol 36,192        
Number of households observed twice 11,964        















Household receives the pension .195***
[.0199]
Household is age-eligible for the pension .159*** .074*** .161*** .258***
[.0203] [.0254] [.0740] [.0634]
A female household member is age-eligible for the pension .159***
[.021]
A male household member is age-eligible for the pension .147***
[.0265]
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household demographics No No No Yes No No
Sample Full Full Full Full No debt Full
Observations 60506 60532 60532 60532 8564 24123
Households 35877 35889 35889 35889 4162 17742
Linear regressions. The dependent variable is 1 if the household has any savings of any form, and 0 otherwise. All regressions include 
household fixed effects and year fixed effects. In column 4, the sample is restricted to those households who reported not taking out any 
debt in the previous 12 months. In column 5, controls are included for the number of female and male household members in each of the 
age groups 0-4, 5-14, 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55+. Robust standard errors, shown in brackets, are clustered at the level of the 
survey primary sampling unit. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.Table 3. Response in household savings to the Old Age Pension.
123 4 5
Dependent variable: Household has savings in any form (binary indicator)
Household receives the pension .07***
[.0132]
Household is age-eligible for then pension .0371*** .0325* 0.0178
[.0133] [.0177] [.0156]
A female household member is age-eligible for the pension .0389***
[.0141]
A male household member is age-eligible for the pension 0.0231
[.0185]
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household demographics No No No No Yes
Sample Full Full Full No debt Full
Observations 61409 61458 61458 41339 61458
Households 36168 36192 36192 28653 36192
Linear regressions. The dependent variable is 1 if the household has any savings of any form, and 0 otherwise. All 
regressions include household fixed effects and year fixed effects. In column 4, the sample is restricted to those 
households who reported not taking out any debt in the previous 12 months. In column 5, controls are included for 
the number of female and male household members in each of the age groups 0-4, 5-14, 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-
54 and 55+. Robust standard errors, shown in brackets, are clustered at the level of the survey primary sampling 
unit. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.Table 4. Response in expenditure to expansion in Child Support Grant eligibility.
1 2 3456
Dependent variable Grant take-up (binary) Log monthly expenditure
Presence of child aged 7 -0.00714 0.0249 0.0223 0.0316 0.000327 -0.00725
[.011] [.0154] [.0154] [.0213] [.0332] [.0329]
Presence of child aged 7 in 2003 .142*** .169*** .168*** -0.0352 -0.0233 -0.0236
[.0183] [.0178] [.0178] [.0328] [.0331] [.0329]
Household and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for number of children aged 0, 1, 2, ... , 9 No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
General household demographics No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 61403 61403 61403 60532 60532 60532
Households 36166 36166 36166 35889 35889 35889
OLS. Columns 1-3 verify that the presence of a child aged seven in 2003 is associated with a greater probability of 
receiving the Child Support Grant than the presence of a child aged seven in 2001 or 2002. In columns 4-6, the 
logarithm of household expenditure is regressed on a binary variable indicating the presence in the household of a 
child aged seven, and an indicator for the presence of a child aged seven in 2003. The coefficient on the latter should 
be near zero under the null hypothesis of forward-looking households and liquidity constraints. The null hypothesis is 
not rejected. In column 2, controls are included for the number of children aged 0, 1, ..., 9 in the household. In column 
3, controls are included for the number of female and male household members in each of the age groups 0-4, 5-14, 
15-24, 25-34, 35-44 and 45-54 and 55+. Year and household fixed effects are used throughout. Robust standard 
errors, shown in brackets, are clustered at the level of the survey primary sampling unit. *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.